Indigenous Taraiwasi vs. Madhesi

Indigenous Taraiwasi vs. Madhesi

- Pramod Mishra

JAN 19 -
At a time when the Constituent Assembly (CA) seems serious about demarcating and naming the federal units, we must understand the distinction between Madhesi and Tarai Janjati and why Rajkumar Lekhi (Kantipur: Jan. 4) and Laxman Tharu (Kantipur: Sept. 21, 2009) have taken up the cudgel against Madhesi leaders and Madhesisation of the ethnic movement. Tharu and Lekhi, the leaders of the Tharuhat movement, want to separate the Tarai indigenous groups from the Madhesi groups. By Madhesi they mean those who are caste Hindus of the Tarai from the Brahmins on down to the non-Dalit castes, such as Yadav, Dhanuk, Baniya, etc. They, however, want to make an alliance with the Madhesi Dalits as they would with the Pahadi Dalits and all other indigenous groups, such as Dhimals, Rajbanshis, Gangais, Sataars, etc.

On the other hand, Madhesi leaders like Upendra Yadav and Jaya Prakash Gupta think that all of Madhes is one in terms of administrative unity: hence, their slogan — One Madhes, One Pradesh. While Gupta and Yadav seem to have withdrawn their claim on the Tharuhat area, they claim Morang, Jhapa and Sunsari to be part of Madhes.  And when that doesn’t seem possible, they cry foul and blame the divide-and-rule policy of the Bahun-Chetri ruling class to create division among Tarai-Madhesi groups.

What is the complex picture of ethnicities in the Tarai?

The cultural practices, geographical location, and more severe political disenfranchisement separate them from the caste Madhesis. For example, all these Tarai indigenous groups have been basically cultivators with a few here and there given the status of zamindar by the rulers before the abolition of zamindari in the 1960s. A Rajbanshi zamindar, for example, despite his control over fellow Rajbanshis and others in revenue collection, juridical matters of reward and punishment, would sit together with each other and eat even though he may not give his daughter to his fellow Rajbanshi peasants in marriage. Instead, he gave his daughters and brought brides from fellow Rajbanshi zamindars across Morang and Jhapa.

But the more significant difference lay in other cultural practices. These ethnic groups, unlike caste Hindus, were animists for the most part. In birth, marriage and funeral ceremonies, they didn’t need a Hindu priest. On the last evening of the funeral ceremonies, they invited their own Rajbanshi Ojhas and the Ojha installed what is called Akhraa in which the Ojha presided over the ceremony with much solemnity.

He sacralised the individual basil leaves in mantra-purified water and lighted a clay lamp with mustard oil, then dipped a leaf in hallowed oil of the lamp, and waved the leaf around and looked up by the light of the lamp to see where the spirit of the deceased was wandering. It was the Ojha’s task to use his uncanny powers to call up the deceased’s spirit to ease its passage across the river to its final abode. As an aid to the Ojha’s efforts, earlier in the day, we, the kinsmen of the deceased, performed Dhemali. We were made to stand in white loin cloth in a row on the courtyard, which had been cleaned and made muddy by pouring a liquid mixture of yoghurt, turmeric powder and other herbs. Then with a signal from Dhod Gosain, the Ojha in our area, we rolled in the mud from one corner to another, mourning the dead. The marriage ceremony, too, didn’t require a Hindu priest.

There was, however, some degree of Hinduisation or what sociologist M.N. Srinivas called Sanskritisation among the Tharus, a little less among Dhimals but especially among Rajbanshis. Many became my father’s Jajmans starting in the 1930s. My father coaxed many of them out of their villages and took them on annual pilgrimage to Char Dham — Badri, Kedar, Dwarika and Rameshwaram — and the trio of Gaya, Kashi, and Prayag. Once or twice, before I was born, he had them organise Katha and presided over it.

Although one can find Rajbanshis on both sides of Nepal-India border, the majority inhabit the stretch of cultivable land along the edges of now denuded forests all along Jhapa and Morang. The Dhimals inhabited a little inside the forest and many ate pork and drank liquor. This marked the difference between the Rajbanshis and Dhimals.  Tharus, too, had a spread-out existence historically all along the Tarai strip.

So, what are the political and cultural implications of this geographical habitation of Tharus, Rajbanshis, Dhimals and so on? One, these Tarai ethnic groups are not traditional caste Hindus in cultural practices. That’s why many Tharu leaders who belonged to Tharu Kalyankarini Sabha reconstructed their ethnic origin by tracing it to the Buddha. Two, because they lived as peasants mostly along the edges of the forest in the Tarai, they do not have the occupational caste traditions as it exists among caste Hindus of Madhes and adjoining Indian states of Bengal, Bihar and UP. They were and are traditionally cultivators of land.  There is little motivation for educational attainment among them. Three, women in these groups have more freedom both at home and outside and attitude toward women’s right to elopement and second marriage is more relaxed.

The Rajbanshis and Tharus, and Dhimals most of all by virtue of their small number and habitation inside the forest, found themselves on the frontline of Hill-Tarai migration. Wherever they encountered the high caste hill folks, they became losers because the hill migrants came motivated by a complex sense of cultural and political empowerment that derived not only from the myriad empowering narratives of the Hindu scriptures but also from the historical sense that the Nepali state belonged to them by virtue of their language as the national language, their caste and kin as people who manned the political and administrative machinery. King Prithvi Narayan Shah was their undisputed hero. They also had a work ethic and frugality born of the tough hilly terrain that gave the hill high caste migrants an edge that these groups could never match. These were further aggravated by the Jagir and Birta systems of the rulers before 1950 and the systematic deforestation of the Tarai thereafter, depriving the Tarai indigenous groups of manure for the land and games, pastures for cattle, leaves and wood for livelihood. They suddenly find their land giving less yield and cultural life impoverished.

On the other hand, the caste Madhesis, both the migrants from India and those who had been living in the Tarai all along, had a sense of cultural resources in the vastness of North India with contiguous castes, cultural and language groups. Most Madhesis had some land, occupational caste skills, a sense of belonging to a larger cultural group and therefore part of the bigger history of India by proxy. Despite the high educational attainments among males among them, they could only be technicians — engineers, doctors, agricultural and medical technicians and teachers -but not civil and security officials. They therefore felt more acutely their second class status. And so, when an Upendra Yadav’s MJF or the Congress thinks of choosing a Taraiwasi for political posts in New Nepal, they prefer caste Madhesis.

The indigenous groups of the Tarai experienced quadruple deprivation: they found themselves on the frontline of Hill-Tarai migration; they couldn’t access the limitless cultural resources of India, unlike the Madhesis; nor could they compensate from Lahure recruitment, like many hill nationalities; and they were nevertheless victims, like the Madhesis, of the discriminatory structures, policies and practices. This discrimination increased multifold after 1960 as the state made incursions into people’s lives through the Panchayat system and opened the door of corruption to enrich the hill high castes in the state machinery.

And so, when Lekhi and Tharu feel frustrated by the Madhesi leaders’ all-hogging attitude, there are complex reasons we need to understand.

source::http://www.kantipuronline.com/the-kathmandu-post/2010/01/19/most-popular/Indigenous-Taraiwasi-vs.-Madhesi/4240/

Young today, leaders tomorrow

Young today, leaders tomorrow

-By Aroosa Masroor

29-year-old Santosh Shah is the publisher and editor of a bi-monthly English magazine ‘Today’s YouthAsia’ and an anchor and director of a television talk show ‘Power Talks’ – both of which cover a wide range of issues that concern and affect the youth of Asia. –Photo by Aroosa Masroor/Dawn.com

KATHMANDU, Nepal: “The future of Nepal lies with the youth,” is Santosh Shah’s response each time he is asked about his involvement in youth affairs. It is the purpose that drives him, says Shah, who is currently the youngest CEO in Nepal.

The 29-year-old is the publisher and editor of a bi-monthly English magazine ‘Today’s YouthAsia’ and an anchor and director of a television talk show ‘Power Talks’ – both of which cover a wide range of issues that concern and affect the youth of Asia.

But success did not come easy to Shah. In fact, he was one of the many students who decided to return to his home country from the US after 9/11. “I was an undergraduate student of Film Studies in New York City when the twin towers were attacked in 2001. Soon after, several students began facing discrimination and one of my teachers advised that I return home,” he explains in an interview with Dawn.com.

Here, in Nepal, the situation was no less chaotic. After the Royal Massacre in June 2001, the country was gripped by political crisis. That is when Shah felt he needed to channel the energy among the youth – who would emerge as future leaders – more positively, he believed.

“It started from a small meeting at a coffee shop with four of my friends,” recalls Shah, who was only 22 when he came back to Kathmandu.

“After years of conflict and an uncertain political situation in Nepal, we felt there was a deficit of leadership here and the youth needed a voice. There was also the need to look at political issues with a fresh eye. That is when we decided to launch a magazine by working with students and equipping them with the right skills and confidence.”

Initially, they formed a group of 16 people that later expanded to 50 in a span of few weeks. Together, they launched the magazine ‘Today’s Youth’ in 2003. This publication was later re-launched in 2007 as Today’s YouthAsia with an expanded outreach.

“I always felt that Asia as a region lacked integration, within its countries and its people. That is why we are judged and analysed through a global lens that is not our own, but that of the West,” explains Shah.

In the same year, the magazine was also launched in Pakistan in the city of Karachi in collaboration with Iqra University. The editorial team in Karachi aims to provide a platform for the Pakistani youth to interact and discuss their issues with youth from other neighbouring countries, including India.

“Like Pakistan, we also face problems of feudalism, nepotism and ethnic diversity in Nepal. Since we found a common ground with Pakistan, we felt we should collaborate with them first.”

As the editorial team in Kathmandu expanded, Shah managed to branch out and initiated other youth-related projects in various schools and colleges of Nepal. Meanwhile, he was working as the South Asian Correspondent for SCOLA Television, headquarters based in Iowa (USA).

During this time, he also began working on a television talk show ‘Power Talks’ that features global leaders, celebrities, diplomats and covers their personal and professional commentaries and insights on world politics, development and change.

“The most challenging part of launching this programme was gathering the finances. Most advertisers found the idea interesting, but they were unwilling to invest in a ‘black man’,” says Shah, referring to his Madheshi caste. People from this caste are labeled as second class citizens by the ruling class in Nepal and are often discriminated against.

However, he managed to raise some funds with the help of his friends and contacts in the international media for the launch of the first season of his show, which became instantly popular among the Nepalese audience.

In 2008, the Universal Peace Federation and its affiliate organisation the Youth Federation for World Peace also acknowledged Santosh Shah as the ‘Youth Ambassador for Peace’ for his active contribution through the media.

“Although the Today YouthAsia (TYA) team now focuses on issues related to all age-groups, we decided to continue with our ‘Youth’ tag in order to represent and emphasise the fact that the focus of this magazine is the future and therefore, the youth.”

“In this context, TYA is exclusively futuristic,” says Shah on his website

source::http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/world/18-young-today-leaders-tomorrow-am-01

Three years later

Three years later
Madhesis have it far better in January 2010 than in January 2007

- PRASHANT JHA

This week marked the third anniversary of the Madhes movement. Over three weeks in January 2007, the spontaneous uprising in Tarai rocked the foundation of Nepali state and nationalism, challenged established forces, ensured federalism, and reconfigured politics. At a time when the Madhes is weaker and more fragmented than it has been since then, it would be instructive to look back at the lessons from the plains.

Here is what the Madhesis told the existing Nepali state: change or perish. In specific terms, this meant political representation, substantive inclusion, reframing symbols of nationhood, and treating citizens who wore dhoti, did not know how to speak Nepali, and had kinship links across the border with dignity and not scorn. If the Kathmandu establishment refused to do so, it would cost the state its legitimacy and erode political authority among one third of its own people. Despite the hiccups, resistance by sections in the capital, and the entrenched social prejudices, the Madhes has won this battle politically and intellectually. What remains is transforming it into institutions.

The second message was to the Maoists: beware of what you have unleashed. Though the Maoists had sowed the militant Madhesi consciousness, the movement itself acquired a strong anti-Maoist tilt. This was due to the failure of the Maoists? to push for federalism in the interim constitution, the recklessness of the Maoist Madhesi leadership, the class character (mid-sized landlords), political orientation (anti-communist), the caste mix of Madhesi leaders, and the perception that the Maoists were a part of the same Pahadi club.

The Maoists have since become more careful, but a similar pattern of ex-Maoists turning to ethnic radicalism can be discerned in the western Tarai. The Maoists and most Madhesi parties remain at loggerheads, but in some ways their commitment to federalism now makes them natural allies.

The people also gave a clear signal to the Nepali Congress, which the grand old party failed to read: reform or shrink. Instead of making the Madhes agenda its own, the NC misread the public mood entirely and felt that the andolan would only hurt the Maoists. The NC home minister (Krishna Sitaula) was seen to have suppressed the movement.

Leaders like Ram Baran Yadav spent all their time in bashing Madhesi leaders and claiming it was sponsored by reactionaries. And the party was a late and reluctant convert to federalism. The failure to innovate meant life was tough if you were a moderate Madhesi NC leader. This breed, led by Mahant Thakur, waited for a year but then left when the pressure from below became intense. The NC’s rout in the elections was a result of its failure in the Madhes.

But the starkest message was to the new Madhesi political class that had created, and capitalized on the Madhes movement: be inclusive of all communities in Tarai, and fight for us in Kathmandu. Through the past three years, the trend has been that as any Madhesi leader or party has come close to Kathmandu or joined the government, it has lost legitimacy and credibility back home in Tarai.

Instead of using the period to build an organisation, and force issues, the leaders have been extremely amenable to co-option, and making a quick buck by looting the state. A glance through the last names of the martyrs reveals that people of all Hindu castes, Dalits, Muslims. But the structures of the Madhesi parties reveal they adopted exclusivist and discriminatory practices and did with Dalits, Muslims and Tharus what hill elites had done with them. This is why the various communities are now finding their own ways of political articulation.

The last year has not been good for the Madhes. Its most powerful party split. It has been unable to force the vice-president back into his position, and get language rights recognised. Madhesi reactionary leaders who had nothing to do with the movement have been able to corner all the advantages and win a share in the power structure.? The distance with the Tharus, who are actually allies in the battle against the old regime, grew. The inclusion bill was never operationalised. And India (by splitting the MJF and not backing the VP) showed that it will happily sacrifice the Madhes if it clashes with its interests at the centre.

But history’s twists and turns should not make us ignore the larger picture. It is far better being a Madhesi in Nepal in January 2010 than it was in January 2007. That is the Madhes movement’s biggest achievement.

source::http://nepalitimes.com/issue/2010/01/22/Nation/16725